BSU bulletin. Philosophy
Bibliographic description:
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: DOES IT HAVE THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS? // BSU bulletin. Philosophy. - 2017. №2. Философия. Philosophy. - С. 97-105.
Title:
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: DOES IT HAVE THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS?
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Annotation:
The article reviews the discussion that has developed over the past two decades be- tween Western methodologists concerning the status of thought experiments. We analyze the most authoritative aspects of the discussion, represented by John Nor- ton, James Brown and Tamar Gendler. The principal provisions are revealed, which defence will lead to confirmation of the epistemic force of thought experiment. In the light of these provisions, the authors' positions, evolution of their views over time, and argumentation are analyzed. Thus, the article shows the pros and cons of intuitivistic and platonic approaches, as well as the results of thought experiments reduction to logical arguments. Lastly, we have made conclusions whether any of the approaches satisfies the provisions.
Keywords:
thought experiment, intuitionistic approach; James Brown; Tamar Gendler; John Norton, reduction of thought experiments, abstraction, theory, ar- gument, knowledge.
List of references:
1. Brown J. Peeking into Plato's heaven // Philosophy of Science. 2004. Vol. 71, No. 5. P. 1126−1138.
2. Brown J. Thought experiment: a platonic account // T. Horowitz and G. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991. P. 119–128.
3. Brown J. Thought experiments since the Scientific Revolution // International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, No. 1. 1986. P. 1−15.
4. Gendler T. Galileo and the Indispensibility of Scientific Thought Experiment // The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(3). 1998. P. 397–424.
5. Khun T. A Function for Thought Experiments. // Khun T. The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. P. 240–265
6. Miscevic N. Mental models and thought experiments// International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 6:3. 1992. P. 215−226.
7. Norton J. Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought? // Canadian Journal of Philosophy, No. 26, 1996. P. 333–366.
8. Norton J. On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument? // Philoso- phy of Science, Vol. 71, No. 5, 2004. P. 1139−1151.
9. Penrose R. The emperors of new mind. Oxford 1989.
10. Sorensen R. Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws // Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 1. 1992. P. 15−44.
2. Brown J. Thought experiment: a platonic account // T. Horowitz and G. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991. P. 119–128.
3. Brown J. Thought experiments since the Scientific Revolution // International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, No. 1. 1986. P. 1−15.
4. Gendler T. Galileo and the Indispensibility of Scientific Thought Experiment // The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(3). 1998. P. 397–424.
5. Khun T. A Function for Thought Experiments. // Khun T. The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. P. 240–265
6. Miscevic N. Mental models and thought experiments// International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 6:3. 1992. P. 215−226.
7. Norton J. Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought? // Canadian Journal of Philosophy, No. 26, 1996. P. 333–366.
8. Norton J. On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument? // Philoso- phy of Science, Vol. 71, No. 5, 2004. P. 1139−1151.
9. Penrose R. The emperors of new mind. Oxford 1989.
10. Sorensen R. Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws // Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 1. 1992. P. 15−44.
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